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Global environmental problems pose entirely new
challenges for science, technology, and policy
making. Persistent scientific uncertainties,
extremely long time horizons (decades to centuries),
the potential need for radical and systemic
technological change, and huge distances in both
time and space between those that are supposed to
act and those that will benefit are in stark contrast
to historical experiences of dealing with envi-
ronmental issues.
Historically, environmental policy making has
relied on scientific advice derived from compara-
tively well-understood and quantified cause–effect
relationships, availability of existing technology
“fixes” that could be applied to single (groups of)
pollutants, and a national decision-making context
in which costs and benefits largely accrue within
the same country, the pan-European efforts to
regulate acid rain precursors and the Montreal
Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone
Layer being notable recent exceptions.
In contrast to this type of environmental policy
making, consider the issue of climate change.
Article 2 of the Framework Convention on Climate
Change requires “stabilization of greenhouse gas
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that
would prevent dangerous anthropogenic inter-
ference with the climate system.” But science is
currently unable to suggest even rough quantitative
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guidelines of what would constitute dangerous
levels of anthropogenic interference. Therefore, a
range of possible climate stabilization targets is
usually analyzed (1), without, however, being able
to narrow down uncertainty ranges or to suggest
particular threshold levels.
Even if such targets could be identified, they
are necessarily very long-term and refer to future
states of the climate system, typically beyond the
second half of the 21st century, or sometimes even
beyond 2100. Thus, “inverse calculations” are
needed to translate such long-term goals into short-
term targets for regulating emissions of greenhouse
gases (2). Unfortunately, these calculations are
plagued by enormous scientific uncertainties,
precluding their direct use in policy making.
Complicating matters further, a multitude of gases
from diverse sources and human activities,
including energy production and use, agriculture,
forestry, waste management, and so forth need to
be considered. Potential emission reductions and
their associated costs remain highly uncertain,
especially for nonindustrial sources and gases other
than CO2 (3).
It should also be noted that, for pragmatic as
well as equity-based reasons, regulating emissions
is first of all a task for the affluent, industrialized
countries. These countries currently emit most of
the greenhouse gases (contributing overpro-
portionately to possible climate change) and also
have the largest scientific and technological
capabilities to research and to implement solutions.
Conversely, it is generally agreed that vulnerability
to possible climate change, at least in the domains
that can be quantified (so-called “market damages”),
is much greater in poor societies than in affluent
ones (4). In other words, we have both an inter-
generational and an international decision-making
problem (5). Present generations of Europeans and
North Americans are supposed to implement as yet
unknown emission reductions that would benefit (in
terms of avoided climate change damages) future
generations of Africans, Chinese, and Indians. At
the same time, we do not seem to care much to
improve the damages from a “climate of poverty”
of much of the current generation of Africans,
Chinese, or Indians either.
	
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Let us now look at a simplified quantification of
the underlying uncertainties. A commonly cited goal
is to stabilize atmospheric concentrations of carbon
dioxide (the largest anthropogenic cause of global
warming) at 550 ppmv, roughly double preindustrial
levels. A carbon cycle model is needed for the
inverse calculation of emissions levels that would
be consistent with that concentration goal. Such
models have many uncertainties, notably in their
assumptions about the flux (F) in terrestrial carbon.
Typically, these models are initialized so that they
reproduce the well-known historical record of
atmospheric CO2 through the 1980s. Emissions of
carbon dioxide due to the combustion of fossil
fuels are relatively well known, yet both the net
carbon fluxes due to land use changes (e.g.,
deforestation) and the carbon uptake due to CO2
fertilization of plants are known only poorly. The
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s
(IPCC’s) review (1) suggests that the best guess for
the land use carbon flux in the 1980s is 1.1 GtC
yr1, but the value ranges from 0.6 GtC yr1 to 2.6
GtC yr1. The level of assumed fertilization depends
on the value selected for land use flux—in order to
balance the model, high land use flux requires high
fertilization.
A simple carbon cycle and climate model (6, 7)
was linked with an energy systems model at the
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis
(IIASA) (8, 9) to illustrate the implications of this
wide uncertainty. If fertilization is high, then
compliance with a 550-ppmv CO2 concentration can
be achieved with much higher levels of fossil fuel
CO2 emissions than if assumed fertilization is
plausibly much lower (see Figure 1a).The cumu-
lative allowable emissions of carbon dioxide from
1990 to 2100 vary from 937 to 1306 GtC. Relative
to a baseline similar to the IPCC IS92a (10)
scenario, the “shadow price” of carbon that would
be needed to comply with the 550-ppmv CO2
concentration target (see Figure 1b), was computed
with the IIASA energy model. In these calculations,
we used a 5% discount rate and assumed full spatial
and temporal flexibility; that is, the model is free to
choose emission reductions when and where they
are cheapest to do. The shadow price, which is akin
	
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to the optimal level for a carbon tax, rises over time
with the discount rate, not the least because the
calculations assume exogenous (and largely static)
technology, following “state-of-the-art” method-
ology (2, 3, 10).
Uncertainties compound if goals are set in terms
of climatic variables such as temperature change.
In addition to carbon cycle uncertainties, sensitivity
of climate to increased radiative forcing from
greenhouse gases is highly uncertain. IPCC’s review
suggests a typical value (2.5 K) for the increase in
global average temperature due to a doubling of
atmospheric CO2 concentrations, but that the value
of the co-called climate sensitivity parameter T2x
ranges plausibly from 1.5 to 4.5 K (1). A wide range
of maximum carbon emissions that comply with
long-term climate targets (from near 0 to 20 GtC yr1
in 2100) occurs (see Figure 1a) if a limit of
T2x = 2.5 K is adopted and the inverse calculation
includes uncertainties in both the carbon cycle and
the climate sensitivity. Cumulative carbon emis-
sions from 1990 to 2100 range from 751 to 1605
GtC, for which corresponding carbon shadow prices
are again shown in Figure 1b. (Note that prices are
zero throughout the simulation period for the
scenario combining low climate sensitivity
(T2x = 1.5) and high carbon fertilization (F = 2.6),
as emissions (the highest emission trajectory in
Figure 1a) are similar to those of the widely used
IS92a (10) baseline scenario and hence require no
emission reductions).
	
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Several implications for policy follow directly from
this analysis. A wide range of emissions targets
results from the inverse calculations, even con-
sidering only the few carbon and climate model
uncertainties in the analysis. Although inverse
calculations have been used to provide important
insights (1, 2), their rigorous use for policy purposes
seems highly premature.
Despite the uncertainties, there is remarkable
convergence to a current value of less than $10 per
ton carbon as the near-term price of carbon. This
value, based on an arbitrary long-term limit of 550
ppmv, is consistent with the optimal carbon tax
computed by Nordhaus (11), using an entirely
different method. Over the long term, however, the
price of carbon in the simple model calculations
reported here rises persistently and to very high
levels (a few hundred to thousands of dollars per
ton of carbon) that are prohibitive from today’s
perspective, making corresponding drastic emission
reductions rather unlikely. Overall, rising future
carbon costs depend on three fundamental variables
(12): the (uncertain) amount of emission reduction
that generally rises over time; how technological
change is factored into the analyses (static or
dynamic); and the discount rate (5% used here, for
a sensitivity analysis (12)).
The values presented here follow “state-of-the-
art” methodology (for example, (2, 3, 10)) by
assuming that rates of technological change are
determined exogenously and are also largely static.
It can be shown with improved methodologies
(13, 14) that over the long term, one can induce
technological change in the direction of further
decarbonization (15, 16), where costs of drastic
emission reductions could be very small, even nil.
Such a benign state of future affairs, however, does
not emerge autonomously. Rather, it requires
continued and dedicated efforts in R&D and niche
market developments to nurture the new tech-
nologies (and to identify and to accept also some
failures) that can take decades to develop fully
(13, 14). Only improved technology can enable
future generations to drastically reduce carbon
emissions at moderate or zero costs, whatever the
quantitative emission target might be.
R&D and accumulation of experience in niche
markets require up-front expenditures of money and
effort. But increasingly, these are viewed as having
too high a price in liberalized markets (17), in which
maximization of shareholder value takes precedence
over long-term development and environmental
protection goals. New initiatives for the public
sector are also called for (18). Because of the
convergence of short-term prices of carbon from
very different analytical perspectives, it may be
more productive and accurate for policy to focus
on coordinating “prices” of carbon. In contrast,
current policy debates such as the Kyoto Protocol
have focused on controlling greenhouse gas
quantities (emissions targets).
	
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Imposing a moderate carbon tax and earmarking
resulting tax revenues to improve the science and
technology that best prepare us for an uncertain
carbon-constrained world might indeed be the best
hedging strategy, in view of pervasive uncertainties.
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